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Abstract
We consider a two-user multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) multiple access
wiretap channel with N antennas at each transmitter, N antennas at the legitimate
receiver, and K antennas at the eavesdropper. We determine the optimal sum secure
degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) for this model for all values of N and K. We subdivide our
problem into several regimes based on the values of N and K, and provide achievable
schemes based on real and vector space alignment techniques for fixed and fading
channel gains, respectively. To prove the optimality of the achievable schemes, we
provide matching converses for each regime. Our results show how the number of
eavesdropper antennas affects the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the multiple access wiretap
channel.
1 Introduction
We consider the two-user multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) multiple access wiretap
channel where each transmitter has N antennas, the legitimate receiver has N antennas
and the eavesdropper has K antennas; see Fig. 1. We consider the case when the channel
gains are fixed throughout the duration of the communication, as well as the case when the
channel is fast fading and the channel gains vary in an i.i.d. fashion across time. Our goal in
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26608, and presented in part at the Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers 2015 and to
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Figure 1: The MIMO multiple access wiretap channel.
this paper is to characterize how the optimal sum secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) of the
MIMO multiple access wiretap channel varies with the number of antennas at the legitimate
users and the eavesdropper.
To that end, we partition the range of K into various regimes, and propose achievable
schemes for each regime. Our schemes are based on a combination of zero-forcing beam-
forming and vector space interference alignment techniques. When the number of antennas
at the eavesdropper is less than the number of antennas at the transmitters, the nullspace of
the eavesdropper channel can be exploited to send secure signals to the legitimate transmit-
ter. This strategy is, in fact, optimal when the number of eavesdropper is sufficiently small
(K ≤ N
2
) and the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is limited by the decoding capability of the legitimate
receiver. We note that the optimal scheme requires a single channel use and thus, can be
used for both fixed and fading channel gains.
However, zero-forcing beamforming does not suffice when K ≥ N
2
. In the regime N
2
≤
K ≤ 4N
3
, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is of the form 2
(
d+ l
3
)
, l = 0, 1, 2, where d is an integer.
For the case of fading channel gains, we use vector space interference alignment [1] over three
time slots to achieve the optimal sum s.d.o.f. The structure of the optimal signaling scheme
is inspired by ideas from the optimal real alignment scheme presented in [2] for the single-
input single-output (SISO) multiple access wiretap channel. Unlike the previous regime, this
scheme for fading channel gains cannot be directly extended to the fixed channel gains case,
except for the case l = 0, for which the sum s.d.o.f. is an integer and carefully precoded
Gaussian signaling suffices. When l 6= 0, the s.d.o.f. has a fractional part, and Gaussian
signaling alone is not optimal. This is also observed in the achievable schemes in [3, 4]
for the MIMO wiretap channel with one helper, where structured signaling is used when
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the optimal s.d.o.f. is not an integer. However, references [3, 4] consider complex channel
gains, for which an s.d.o.f. of the form
(
d+ 1
2
)
can be obtained by using d complex symbols
(which comprise two real symbols) and one real symbol, where each real symbol belongs
to the same PAM constellation and carries 1
2
s.d.o.f. In our case, the s.d.o.f. is of the form
2
(
d+ l
3
)
, l = 0, 1, 2, and such simplification is not possible even with complex channel gains.
In this paper, we consider real channel gains. In order to handle the fractional s.d.o.f.,
we decompose the channel input at each transmitter into two parts: a Gaussian signaling
part carrying d (the integer part) d.o.f. of information securely, and a structured signaling
part carrying l
3
(the fractional part) d.o.f. of information securely. The structure of the
Gaussian signals carrying the integer s.d.o.f. resembles that of the schemes for the fading
channel gains. When l = 1, we design the structured signals carrying 2
3
sum s.d.o.f. according
to the real interference alignment based SISO scheme of [2]. However, when l = 2, a new
scheme is required to achieve 4
3
sum s.d.o.f. on the MIMO multiple access wiretap channel
with two antennas at every terminal. To that end, we provide a novel optimal scheme for
the canonical 2×2×2×2 MIMO multiple access wiretap channel. Interestingly, the scheme
relies on asymptotic real interference alignment [5] at each antenna of the legitimate receiver.
When the number of eavesdropper antennas K is large enough K ≥ 4N
3
, the optimal sum
s.d.o.f. is given by (2N −K), which is always an integer. In this regime Gaussian signaling
along with vector space alignment techniques suffices. In fact, the scheme uses only one
time slot and can be used with both fixed and fading channel gains. When the number of
antennas at the eavesdropper is very large (K ≥ 3N
2
), the two-user multiple access wiretap
channel reduces to a wiretap channel with one helper, and, thus, the scheme for the MIMO
wiretap channel with one helper in [4] is optimal.
To establish the optimality of our achievable schemes, we present matching converses in
each regime. A simple upper bound is obtained by allowing cooperation between the two
transmitters. This reduces the two-user multiple access wiretap channel to a MIMO wiretap
channel with 2N antennas at the transmitter, N antennas at the legitimate receiver and K
antennas at the eavesdropper. The optimal s.d.o.f. of this MIMO wiretap channel is well
known to be min((2N−K)+, N) [6,7], and this serves as an upper bound for the sum s.d.o.f. of
the two-user multiple access wiretap channel. This bound is optimal when the number of
eavesdropper antennas K is either quite small (K ≤ N
2
), or quite large (K ≥ 4N
3
). When K
is small, the sum s.d.o.f. is limited by the decoding capability of the legitimate receiver, and
the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is N which is optimal even without any secrecy constraints. When K
is large, the s.d.o.f. is limited by the requirement of secrecy from a very strong eavesdropper.
For intermediate values of K, the distributed nature of the transmitters dominates, and we
employ a generalization of the SISO converse techniques of [2] for the converse proof in the
MIMO case, similar to [4].
Related Work: The multiple access wiretap channel is introduced by [8,9], where the tech-
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nique of cooperative jamming is introduced to improve the rates achievable with Gaussian
signaling. Reference [10] provides outer bounds and identifies cases where these outer bounds
are within 0.5 bits per channel use of the rates achievable by Gaussian signaling. While the
exact secrecy capacity remains unknown, the achievable rates in [8–10] all yield zero s.d.o.f.
Reference [11] proposes scaling-based and ergodic alignment techniques to achieve a sum
s.d.o.f. of K−1
K
for the K-user MAC-WT; thus, showing that an alignment based scheme
strictly outperforms i.i.d. Gaussian signaling with or without cooperative jamming at high
SNR. Finally, references [2, 12] establish the optimal sum s.d.o.f. to be K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1 and the
full s.d.o.f. region, respectively, for the SISO multiple access wiretap channel. Other related
channel models are the wiretap channel with helpers and the interference channel with confi-
dential messages, for which the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is known for the SISO and MIMO cases
in [2] and [3, 4], and in [13] and [14], respectively.
2 System Model
The two-user multiple access wiretap channel, see Fig. 1, is described by,
Y(t) =H1(t)X1(t) + H2(t)X2(t) + N1(t) (1)
Z(t) =G1(t)X1(t) + G2(t)X2(t) + N2(t) (2)
where Xi(t) is an N dimensional column vector denoting the ith user’s channel input, Y(t)
is an N dimensional vector denoting the legitimate receiver’s channel output, and Z(t) is a
K dimensional vector denoting the eavesdropper’s channel output, at time t. In addition,
N1(t) and N2(t) are N and K dimensional white Gaussian noise vectors, respectively, with
N1 ∼ N (0, IN) and N2 ∼ N (0, IK), where IN denotes theN×N identity matrix. Here, Hi(t)
and Gi(t) are the N ×N and K ×N channel matrices from transmitter i to the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, at time t. When the channel gains are fixed, the
entries of Hi(t) and Gi(t) are drawn from an arbitrary but fixed continuous distribution with
bounded support in an i.i.d. fashion prior to the start of the communication, and remain fixed
throughout the duration of the communication, i.e., for 1 ≤ t ≤ n. When the channel gains
are fading, the entries of Hi(t) and Gi(t) are drawn from the fixed continuous distribution
with bounded support in an i.i.d. fashion at every time slot t. We assume that the channel
matrices Hi(t) and Gi(t) are known with full precision at all terminals, at time t. All channel
inputs satisfy the average power constraint E[‖Xi(t)‖2] ≤ P, i = 1, 2, where ‖X‖ denotes
the Euclidean (or the spectral norm) of the vector (or matrix) X.
Transmitter i wishes to send a message Wi, uniformly distributed in Wi, securely to
the legitimate receiver in the presence of the eavesdropper. A secure rate pair (R1, R2),
with Ri =
log |Wi|
n
is achievable if there exists a sequence of codes which satisfy the reliability
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constraints at the legitimate receiver, namely, Pr[Wi 6= Wˆi] ≤ n, for i = 1, 2, and the secrecy
constraint, namely,
1
n
I(W1,W2; Z
n) ≤ n (3)
where n → 0 as n → ∞. An s.d.o.f. pair (d1, d2) is said to be achievable if a rate pair
(R1, R2) is achievable with
di = lim
P→∞
Ri
1
2
logP
(4)
The sum s.d.o.f. ds is the largest achievable d1 + d2.
3 Main Result
The main result of this paper is the determination of the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the MIMO
multiple access wiretap channel. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the MIMO multiple access wiretap channel with N
antennas at the transmitters, N antennas at the legitimate receiver and K antennas at the
eavesdropper is given by
ds =

N, if K ≤ 1
2
N
2
3
(2N −K), if 1
2
N ≤ K ≤ N
2
3
N, if N ≤ K ≤ 4
3
N
2N −K, if 4
3
N ≤ K ≤ 2N
0, if K ≥ 2N.
(5)
for almost all channel gains.
We present the converse proof for this theorem in Section 4. The achievable schemes for
the case of fading channel gains are presented in Section 5, while the achievable schemes for
the case of fixed channel gains are presented in Section 6.
Fig. 2 shows the variation of the optimal sum s.d.o.f. with the number of eavesdropper
antennas K. Note that as in the SISO case, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is higher for the
multiple access wiretap channel than for the wiretap channel with one helper [4], when
K < 3N/2. However, when the number of eavesdropper antennas K is large enough, i.e.,
when K ≥ 3N/2, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the multiple access wiretap channel is the same
as the optimal s.d.o.f. of the wiretap channel with a helper.
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Figure 2: ds versus K.
Further, note that when the number of eavesdropper antennas K is small enough (K ≤
N
2
), the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is N , which is the optimal d.o.f. of the multiple access channel
without any secrecy constraints. Thus, there is no penalty for imposing the secrecy con-
straints in this regime. Also note that allowing cooperation beteen the transmitters does not
increase the sum s.d.o.f. in this regime. Heuristically, the eavesdropper is quite weak in this
regime, and the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is limited by the decoding capabilities of the legitimate
receiver.
On the other hand, when the number of antennas K is quite large (K ≥ 4N
3
), the optimal
sum s.d.o.f. is (2N − K), which is the optimal s.d.o.f. obtained by allowing cooperation
between the transmitters. Intuitively, the eavesdropper is very strong in this regime and the
sum s.d.o.f. is limited by the requirement of secrecy from this strong eavesdropper. In the
intermediate regime, when N
2
≤ K ≤ 4N
3
, the distributed nature of the transmitters becomes
a key factor and the upper bound obtained by allowing cooperation between the transmitters
is no longer achievable; see Fig. 3.
4 Proof of the Converse
We prove the following upper bounds which are combined to give the converse for the full
range of N and K,
d1 + d2 ≤min((2N −K)+, N) (6)
d1 + d2 ≤max
(
2
3
(2N −K), 2
3
N
)
(7)
where (x)+ denotes max(x, 0).
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It can be verified from Fig. 3 that the minimum of the two bounds in (6)-(7) gives the
converse to the sum s.d.o.f. stated in (5) for all ranges of N and K. Thus, we next provide
proofs of each of the bounds in (6) and (7).
4.1 Proof of d1 + d2 ≤ min((2N −K)+, N)
This bound follows by allowing cooperation between the transmitters, which reduces the
two-user multiple access wiretap channel to a single-user MIMO wiretap channel with 2N
antennas at the transmitter, N antennas at the legitimate receiver and K antennas at the
eavesdropper. The optimal s.d.o.f. for this MIMO wiretap channel is known to be min((2N−
K)+, N) [6, 7].
4.2 Proof of d1 + d2 ≤ max
(
2
3(2N −K), 23N
)
We only show that d1+d2 ≤ 23(2N−K), when K ≤ N , and note that the bound d1+d2 ≤ 23N
for K > N follows from the fact that increasing the number of eavesdropper antennas cannot
increase the sum s.d.o.f.; thus, the sum s.d.o.f. when K > N is upper-bounded by the sum
s.d.o.f. for the case of K = N , which is 2
3
N .
To prove d1 + d2 ≤ 23(2N −K) when K ≤ N , we follow [2, 4]. We define noisy versions
of Xi as X˜i = Xi + N˜i where N˜i ∼ N (0, ρ2i IN) with ρ2i < min
(
1
‖Hi‖2 ,
1
‖Gi‖2
)
. The secrecy
penalty lemma [2] can then be derived as
n(R1 +R2) ≤I(W1,W2; Yn|Zn) + n (8)
≤h(Yn|Zn) + nc1 (9)
=h(Yn,Zn)− h(Zn) + nc1 (10)
≤h(X˜n1 , X˜n2 )− h(Zn) + nc2 (11)
≤h(X˜n1 ) + h(X˜n2 )− h(Zn) + nc2 (12)
Now consider a stochastically equivalent version of Z given by Z˜ = G1X˜1 + G2X2 + NZ ,
where NZ is an independent Gaussian noise vector, distributed as N (0, IK − ρ21G1GH1 ).
Further, let G1 = [G˜1 Gˆ1] and X˜
T
1 = [X˜
T
1a X˜
T
1b]
T , where G˜1 is the matrix with the first
K columns of G1, Gˆ1 has the last N −K columns of G1, X˜1a is a vector with the top K
elements of X˜1, while X˜1b has the remaining N −K elements of X˜1. Then, we have
h(Zn) = h(Z˜n) =h(Gn1X˜
n
1 + G
n
2X
n
2 + N
n
Z) (13)
≥h(Gn1X˜n1 ) (14)
=h(G˜n1X˜
n
1a + Gˆ
n
1X˜
n
1b) (15)
≥h(G˜n1X˜n1a|X˜n1b) (16)
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Figure 3: The two upper bounds.
=h(X˜n1a|X˜n1b) + nc3 (17)
Using (17) in (12), we have
n(R1 +R2) ≤h(X˜n1b) + h(X˜n2 ) + nc4 (18)
The role of a helper lemma [2] also generalizes to the MIMO case as
nR1 ≤I(Xn1 ; Yn) (19)
=h(Yn)− h(Hn2Xn2 + Nn1 ) (20)
≤h(Yn)− h(X˜n2 ) + nc5 (21)
Adding (18) and (21), we have
n(2R1 +R2) ≤h(Yn) + h(X˜n1b) + nc6 (22)
≤Nn
2
logP + (N −K)n
2
logP + nc7 (23)
=(2N −K)n
2
logP + nc7 (24)
First dividing by n and letting n → ∞, and then dividing by 1
2
logP and letting P → ∞,
we have
2d1 + d2 ≤ 2N −K (25)
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By reversing the roles of the transmitters, we have
d1 + 2d2 ≤ 2N −K (26)
Combining (25) and (26), we have the required bound
d1 + d2 ≤ 2
3
(2N −K) (27)
This completes the proof of the converse of Theorem 1.
5 Achievable Schemes for Fading Channel Gains
We provide separate achievable schemes for each of the following regimes:
1. K ≤ N/2
2. N/2 ≤ K ≤ N
3. N ≤ K ≤ 4N/3
4. 4N/3 ≤ K ≤ 3N/2
5. 3N/2 ≤ K ≤ 2N
Each scheme described in the following sections can be outlined as follows. We neglect
the impact of noise at high SNR. Then, to achieve a certain sum s.d.o.f., ds, we achieve
the s.d.o.f. pair (d1, d2) with ds = d1 + d2. We send n1 symbols v1 = (v11, . . . , v1n1) and n2
symbols v2 = (v21, . . . , v2n2) from the first and second transmitters, respectively, in nB slots,
such that d1 = n1/nB and d2 = n2/nB. Finally, we show that the leakage of information
symbols at the eavesdropper is o(logP ). We however want a stronger guarantee of security,
namely,
1
n
I(W1,W2; Z
n)→ 0 (28)
as n → ∞. To achieve this, we view the nB slots described in the scheme as a block and
treat the equivalent channel from v1 and v2 to Y and Z as a memoryless multiple access
wiretap channel with Y being the output at the legitimate receiver and Z being the output
at the eavesdropper. The following sum secure rate is achievable [15]:
sup(R1 +R2) ≥ I(V; Y)− I(V; Z) (29)
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where V
∆
= {v1,v2}. Using the proposed scheme, v1 and v2 can be reconstructed from Y to
within noise distortion. Thus,
I(V; Y) =(n1 + n2)
1
2
logP + o(logP ) (30)
Also, for each scheme, by design
I(V; Z) =o(logP ) (31)
Thus, from (29), the achievable sum secure rate in each block is (n1 + n2)
1
2
logP + o(logP ).
Since our block contains nB channel uses, the effective sum secure rate is
sup(R1 +R2) ≥
(
n1 + n2
nB
)
1
2
logP + o(logP ) (32)
Thus, the achievable sum s.d.o.f. is n1+n2
nB
, with the stringent security requirement as well.
In the following subsections, we present the achievable scheme for each regime.
5.1 K ≤ N/2
In this regime, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is N . In our scheme, transmitter 1 sends (N −K)
independent Gaussian symbols v1 ∈ RN−K while transmitter 2 sends K independent Gaus-
sian symbols v2 ∈ RK , in one time slot. This can be done by beamforming the information
streams at both transmitters to directions that are orthogonal to the eavesdropper’s channel.
To this end, the transmitted signals are:
X1 = P1v1 (33)
X2 = P2v2 (34)
where P1 ∈ RN×(N−K) is a matrix whose (N −K) columns span the (N −K) dimensional
nullspace of G1, and P2 ∈ RN×K is a matrix with K linearly independent vectors drawn
from the (N −K) dimensional nullspace of G2. This can be done since K ≤ N −K. The
channel outputs are:
Y =[H1P1 H2P2]
[
v1
v2
]
+ N1 (35)
Z =N2 (36)
Note that [H1P1 H2P2] is an N×N matrix with full rank almost surely, and thus, both v1
and v2 can be decoded at the legitimate receiver to within noise variance. On the other hand,
10
they do not appear in the eavesdropper’s observation and thus their security is guaranteed.
5.2 N/2 ≤ K ≤ N
The optimal sum s.d.o.f. in this regime is 2
3
(2N −K). Thus, transmitter i sends (2N −K)
Gaussian symbols
{
vi ∈ R2K−N , v˜i(t) ∈ RN−K , t = 1, 2, 3
}
, each drawn independently from
N (0, P¯ ), in 3 time slots for i = 1, 2, where P¯ = αP and α is chosen to satisfy the power
constraint. Intuitively, transmitter i sends the (N − K) symbols v˜i(t) by beamforming
orthogonal to the eavesdropper in each time slot t = 1, 2, 3. The remaining (2K − N)
symbols are sent over 3 time slots using a scheme similar to the SISO scheme of [2, 16].
Thus, the transmitted signals at time t are:
X1(t) =G1(t)
⊥v˜1(t) + P1(t)v1 + H1(t)−1Q(t)u1 (37)
X2(t) =G2(t)
⊥v˜2(t) + P2(t)v2 + H2(t)−1Q(t)u2 (38)
where Gi(t)
⊥ is an N × (N − K) full rank matrix with Gi(t)Gi(t)⊥ = 0N×(N−K), ui is a
(2K −N) dimensional vector whose entries are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from N (0, P¯ ), and
Pi and Q are N×(2K−N) precoding matrices that will be fixed later. The channel outputs
are:
Y(t) =H1(t)G1(t)
⊥v˜1(t) + H1(t)P1(t)v1 + H2(t)P2(t)v2
+ H2(t)G2(t)
⊥v˜2(t) + Q(t)(u1 + u2) + N1(t) (39)
Z(t) =G1(t)P1(t)v1 + G2(t)H2(t)
−1Q(t)u2
+ G2(t)P2(t)v2 + G1(t)H1(t)
−1Q(t)u1 + N2(t) (40)
We now choose Q(t) to be any N × (2K −N) matrix with full column rank, and choose
Pi(t) = Gi(t)
T (Gi(t)Gi(t)
T )−1(Gj(t)Hj(t)−1)Q(t) (41)
where i, j ∈ {1, 2} , i 6= j. It can be verified that this selection aligns vi with uj, i 6= j,
at the eavesdropper, and this guarantees that the information leakage is o(logP ). On the
other hand, the legitimate receiver decodes the desired signals
{
v˜i(t) ∈ RN−K , t ∈ {1, 2, 3}
}
,{
vi ∈ R2K−N , i = 1, 2
}
and the aligned artificial noise symbols u1 + u2 ∈ R2K−N , i.e., 6(N −
K) + 3(2N − K) = 3N symbols using 3N observations in 3 time slots, to within noise
variance. This completes the scheme for the regime N/2 ≤ K ≤ N .
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5.3 N ≤ K ≤ 4N/3
In this regime, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is 2
3
N . Therefore, transmitter i in our scheme sends
N Gaussian symbols, vi ∈ RN , in 3 time slots. The transmitted signals in time slot t are
given by
X1(t) = P1(t)v1 + H1(t)
−1Q(t)u1 (42)
X2(t) = P2(t)v2 + H1(t)
−1Q(t)u2 (43)
where the P1(t), Q(t), and P2(t) are N×N precoding matrices to be designed. Let us define
P˜i
∆
=
 Pi(1)Pi(2)
Pi(3)
 , Q˜ ∆=
 Q(1)Q(2)
Q(3)
 (44)
Further, if we define
H˜i
∆
=
 Hi(1) 0N×N 0N×N0N×N Hi(2) 0N×N
0N×N 0N×N Hi(3)
 (45)
and G˜i similarly, we can compactly represent the channel outputs over all 3 time slots as
Y˜ =H˜1P˜1v1 + H˜2P˜2v2 + Q˜(u1 + u2) + N˜1 (46)
Z˜ =G˜1P˜1v1 + G˜2H˜
−1
2 Q˜u2 + G˜2P˜2v2 + G˜1H˜
−1
1 Q˜u1 + N˜2 (47)
where N˜i
∆
= [Ni(1)
T Ni(2)
T Ni(3)
T ]T , Y˜
∆
= [Y(1)T Y(2)T Y(3)T ]T , and Z˜ is defined
similarly. To ensure secrecy, we impose the following conditions
G˜1P˜1 =G˜2H˜
−1
2 Q˜ (48)
G˜2P˜2 =G˜1H˜
−1
1 Q˜ (49)
We rewrite the conditions in (48)-(49) as
Ψ
 P˜1P˜2
Q˜
 = 06K×N (50)
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where
Ψ
∆
=
[
G˜1 03K×3N −G˜2H˜−12
03K×3N G˜2 −G˜1H˜−11
]
(51)
Note that Ψ has a nullity 9N − 6K. Since 9N − 6K ≥ N in this regime, we can choose
N vectors of dimension 9N randomly such that they are linearly independent and lie in the
nullspace of Ψ. We can then assign to P˜1, P˜2 and Q˜, the top, the middle and the bottom
3N rows of the matrix comprising the N chosen vectors. This guarantees secrecy of the
message symbols at the eavesdropper.
To see the decodability, we rewrite the received signal at the legitimate receiver as
Y˜ = Φ
 v1v2
u1 + u2
+ N˜1 (52)
where Φ
∆
= [H˜1P˜1 H˜2P˜2 Q˜]. We note that Φ is 3N × 3N and full rank almost surely;
thus, the desired signals v1 and v2 can be decoded at the legitimate receiver within noise
distortion at high SNR.
5.4 4N/3 ≤ K ≤ 3N/2
The optimal s.d.o.f. in this regime is 2N −K. To achieve this s.d.o.f., the first transmitter
sends K −N Gaussian symbols {v1 ∈ R3N−2K , v˜ ∈ R3K−4N}, while the second transmitter
sends 3N−2K Gaussian symbols {v2 ∈ R3N−2K}, in one time slot. The scheme is as follows.
The transmitted signals are
X1 = R1v˜ + P1v1 + H
−1
1 Qu1 (53)
X2 = R2u˜ + P2v2 + H
−1
2 Qu2 (54)
where u˜ ∈ R3K−4N and u1,u2 ∈ R3N−2K are artificial noise vectors, whose entries are
drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from N (0, P¯ ). The precoding matrices Ri ∈ RN×(3K−4N), and
Pi,Qi ∈ RN×(3N−2K) will be chosen later. The channel outputs are
Y =H1R1v˜ + H1P1v1 + H2P2v2 + H2R2u˜ + Q(u1 + u2) + N1 (55)
Z =G1R1v˜ + G2R2u˜ + G1P1v1 + G2H
−1
2 Qu2 + G2P2v2 + G1H
−1
1 Qu1 + N2 (56)
To ensure secrecy, we want to impose the following conditions:
G1R1 =G2R2 (57)
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G1P1 =G2H
−1
2 Q (58)
G2P2 =G1H
−1
1 Q (59)
To satisfy (57), we choose R1 and R2 to be the first and the last N rows of a 2N × 3K− 4N
matrix whose columns consist of any 3K−4N linearly independent vectors drawn randomly
from the nullspace of [G1 −G2]. This is possible since, 3K−4N ≤ 2N−K in this regime.
To satisfy (58)-(59), we let P1, P2 and Q to be the first, the second and the last N rows
of a 3N × (3N − 2K) matrix whose columns are randomly chosen to span the (3N − 2K)
dimensional nullspace of the matrix Λ given by
Λ
∆
=
[
G1 0K×N −G2H−12
0K×N G2 −G1H−11
]
(60)
To see the decodablity, we can rewrite the observation at the legitimate receiver as
Y = Φ

v˜
v1
v2
u˜
u1 + u2
+ N1 (61)
where Φ is the N ×N matrix defined as
Φ = [H1R1 H1P1 H2P2 H2R2 Q] (62)
Since Φ is full rank almost surely, the legitimate receiver can decode its desired symbols
v˜,v1, and v2.
5.5 3N/2 ≤ K ≤ 2N
In this regime, it is clear from Fig. 2 that the multiple access wiretap channel has the same
optimal sum s.d.o.f. as the optimal s.d.o.f. of the wiretap channel with one helper. Thus,
an optimal achievable scheme for the wiretap channel with one helper suffices as the scheme
for the multiple access wiretap channel as well. Such an optimal scheme, based on real
interference alignment, is provided in [4] for the wiretap channel with one helper with fixed
channel gains. Here, we provide a scheme based on vector space alignment.
In order to achieve the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of 2N−K in this regime, the first transmitter
sends 2N − K independent Gaussian symbols v ∈ R2N−K securely, in one time slot. The
second transmitter just transmits artificial noise symbols u ∈ R2N−K , whose entries are
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drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from N (0, P¯ ). The transmitted signals are
X1 = Pv (63)
X2 = Qu (64)
where P and Q are N × (2N −K) precoding matrices to be fixed later. The received signals
are
Y =H1Pv + H2Qu + N1 (65)
Z =G1Pv + G2Qu + N2 (66)
To ensure security, we wish to ensure that
G1P = G2Q (67)
This can be done by choosing P and Q to be the top and the bottom N rows of a 2N×(2N−
K) matrix whose linearly independent columns are drawn randomly from the nullspace of
[G1 − G2]. The decodability is ensured by noting that the matrix [H1P H2Q] is full
column rank and 2(2N −K) ≤ N in this regime.
6 Achievable Schemes for Fixed Channel Gains
We note that the achievable schemes proposed for the fading channel gains in the regimes
K ≤ N
2
and 4N
2
≤ K ≤ 2N are single time-slot schemes and suffice for the fixed channel
gains case. However, in the regime N
2
≤ K ≤ 4N
3
, the schemes for the fading channel gains
exploit the diversity of channel gains over three time slots; thus, these schemes cannot be
used in the fixed channel gains case. Therefore, we now propose new achievable schemes
for this regime. In this regime, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is of the form 2
(
d+ l
3
)
, l = 0, 1, 2,
where d is an integer. When l = 0, the sum s.d.o.f. is an integer and carefully precoded
Gaussian signaling suffices. However, when l 6= 0, the s.d.o.f. has a fractional part, and
Gaussian signaling alone is not optimal, since Gaussian signals with full power cannot carry
fractional d.o.f. of information.
The general structure of our schemes is as follows: We decompose the channel input
at each transmitter into two parts: a Gaussian signaling part carrying d (the integer part)
d.o.f. of information securely, and a structured signaling part carrying l
3
(the fractional part)
d.o.f. of information securely. The structure of the Gaussian signals carrying the integer
s.d.o.f. d are the same as that of the corresponding schemes for the fading channel gains.
This ensures security at the eavesdropper as well as decodability at the legitimate receiver as
long as the structured signals carrying the fractional s.d.o.f. 2l
3
from both transmitters can be
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decoded at the legitimate receiver. The design of the structured signals is motivated from the
SISO scheme of [2]. In fact, when l = 1, we use the signal structure of the scheme in [2], where
real interference alignment is used to transmit 2
3
sum s.d.o.f. on the SISO multiple access
wiretap channel. However, when l = 2, a new scheme is required to achieve 4
3
sum s.d.o.f. on
the MIMO multiple access wiretap channel with two antennas at every terminal. To that
end, we first provide a novel scheme, based on asymptotic real interference alignment [5,17],
for the canonical 2× 2× 2× 2 MIMO multiple access wiretap channel.
6.1 Scheme for the 2× 2× 2× 2 System
The optimal sum s.d.o.f. is 4
3
. Since the legitimate receiver has 2 antennas, we achieve 2
3
s.d.o.f. on each antenna. The scheme is as follows.
Let m be a large integer. Define M
∆
= mΓ, where Γ will be specified later. The channel
inputs are given by
X1 =G
−1
1 G2H
−1
2
(
tT1 v11
t2v12
)
+ H−11
(
tT1 u11
t2u12
)
(68)
X2 =G
−1
2 G1H
−1
1
(
tT1 v21
t2v22
)
+ H−12
(
tT1 u21
t2u22
)
(69)
where ti, i = 1, 2 are M dimensional precoding vectors which will be fixed later, and uij,vij
are independent random variables drawn uniformly from the same PAM constellation C(a,Q)
given by
C(a,Q) = a {−Q,−Q+ 1, . . . , Q− 1, Q} (70)
where Q is a positive integer and a is a real number used to normalize the transmission
power. The exact values of a and Q will be specified later. The variables vij denote the
information symbols of transmitter i, while uij are the cooperative jamming signals being
transmitted from transmitter i.
The channel outputs are given by
Y =A
(
tT1 v11
t2v12
)
+ B
(
tT1 v21
t2v22
)
+
(
tT1 (u11 + u21)
t2(u12 + u22)
)
+ N1 (71)
Z =G1H
−1
1
(
tT1 (u11 + v21)
t2(u12 + v22)
)
+ G2H
−1
2
(
tT1 (u21 + v11)
t2(u22 + v12)
)
+ N2 (72)
where A = H1G
−1
1 G2H
−1
2 and B = H2G
−1
2 G1H
−1
1 . Note that the information symbols
vij are buried in the cooperative jamming signals ukj, where k 6= i, at the eavesdropper.
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Intuitively, this ensures security of the information symbols at the eavesdropper. At the
legitimate receiver, we can express the received signal Y more explicitly as(
tT2 (a12v12 + b12v22) + t
T
1 (a11v11 + b11v21 + u11 + u21)
tT1 (a21v11 + b21v21) + t
T
2 (a22v12 + b22v22 + u12 + u22)
)
(73)
We define
T1 = {ar111br211, ri ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}} (74)
T2 = {ar122br222, ri ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}} (75)
Letting Γ = 2, we note that
|T1| = |T2| = M (76)
We choose ti to be the M dimensional vector that has all the elements of Ti. We note that all
elements in Ti are rationally independent, since the channel gains are drawn independently
from a continuous distribution. Also, the elements of Ti can be verified to be rationally
independent of the elements of Tj, if i 6= j. With the above selections, let us analyze the
structure of the received signal at the legitimate receiver.
At the first antenna, u11 and u21 arrive along the dimensions of T1. The signals v11 and
v21 arrive along dimensions a11T1 and b11T1 and, thus, they align with u11 and u21 in T˜1,
where,
T˜1 = {ar111br211, ri ∈ {0, . . . ,m}} (77)
Thus, v11 and v21 cannot be reliably decoded from the observation of the first antenna.
However, the desired signals v12 and v22 arrive along dimensions a12T2 and b12T2, respec-
tively. Note that the elements of a12T2 and b12T2 are rationally independent and thus, v12
and v22 occupy separate rational dimensions. Also they are separate from the interference
space T˜1. Therefore, v12 and v22 can be reliably decoded at high SNR. Heuristically, the
s.d.o.f. achieved using the first antenna is 2|T1|
2|T1|+|T˜2| =
2m2
2m2+(m+1)2
≈ 2
3
for large enough m.
At the second antenna, a similar analysis holds. The signals v12, v22, u12 and u22 align
with each other in the dimensions of T˜2, which is defined as
T˜2 = {ar122br222, ri ∈ {0, . . . ,m}} (78)
The signals v11 and v21 arrive along dimensions that are separate from each other as well
as from the dimensions in T˜2, and thus, can be decoded reliably. The s.d.o.f. achieved in
the second antenna is also 2m
2
2m2+(m+1)2
≈ 2
3
for large m. Therefore, the sum s.d.o.f. achieved
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using both antennas is 4
3
, as desired.
Formally, an achievable sum rate is given in equation (29), where V
∆
= {vij, i, j ∈ {1, 2}}.
In order to bound the term I(V; Y), we first bound the probability of error. Let MS
∆
=
2m2 + (m + 1)2 be the number of rational dimensions at each receiver antenna. Also let
Vi = {vkj, k = 1, 2; j 6= i} be the desired symbols at the ith antenna of the receiver. In
order to decode, the receiver makes an estimate Vˆi of Vi by choosing the closest point in
the constellation based on the signal received at antenna i. For any δ > 0, there exists a
positive constant γ, which is independent of P , such that if we choose Q = P
1−δ
2(MS+δ) and
a = γP
1
2
Q
, then for almost all channel gains the average power constraint is satisfied and the
probability of error, Pr(Vi 6= Vˆi), is upper-bounded by exp
(−ηγP δ), where ηγ is a positive
constant which is independent of P . Since V = {Vi, i = 1, 2},
Pr(V 6= Vˆ) ≤ 2 exp (−ηγP δ) (79)
By Fano’s inequality and the Markov chain V→ Y → Vˆ,
I(V; Y) = H(V)−H(V|Vˆ) (80)
≥ log(|V|)− 1− Pr(V 6= Vˆ) log(|V|) (81)
= log(|V|)− o(logP ) (82)
=
4M(1− δ)
MS + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (83)
where V is the alphabet of V with cardinality (2Q+ 1)4M = (2Q+ 1)4m2 . Next, we compute
I(V; Z) ≤I
(
{vij, i, j = 1, 2} ;
{
vij + uiˆj,
iˆ 6= i,
i, j = 1, 2
})
(84)
≤
2∑
i,j=1,ˆi 6=i
H(vij + uiˆj)−H(uiˆj) (85)
≤4M log(4Q+ 1)− 4M log(2Q+ 1) (86)
≤4M = o(logP ) (87)
Using (83) and (87) in (29), we have
sup(R1 +R2) ≥4M(1− δ)
MS + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (88)
By choosing δ small enough and m large enough, we can make the sum s.d.o.f. arbitrarily
close to 4
3
.
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6.2 Achievable Schemes for N2 ≤ K ≤ N
We use structured PAM signaling along with Gaussian signaling. Let d = b2K−N
3
c, and l =
(2K−N)mod 3 = (2N−K)mod 3. Let v(1)i = {vij, j = 1, . . . , d}, where each vij, j = 1, . . . , d
is drawn in an i.i.d. fashion ∼ N (0, αP ), and v(2)i =
{
vi(d+1), . . . , vi(d+l)
}
are structured PAM
signals to be specified later. When l = 0, v
(2)
i is the empty set. Let vi =
(
v
(1)
i ,v
(2)
i
)
. Also,
let v˜i = {v˜ij, j = 1, . . . , N −K} denote the symbols that can be transmitted securely by
beamforming orthogonal to the eavesdropper channel. Transmitter i sends:
Xi =G
⊥
i v˜i + Pivi + H
−1
i Qui (89)
where G⊥i is an N× (N−K) full rank matrix with GiG⊥i = 0N×(N−K), ui =
(
u
(1)
i ,u
(2)
i
)
is a
(d+ l) dimensional vector with the entries of u
(1)
i = {uij, j = 1, . . . , d} being drawn indepen-
dently of v and each other from N (0, αP ), and the structure of u(2)i =
{
ui(d+1), . . . , ui(d+l)
}
will be specified later. Pi and Q are N × (d + l) precoding matrices that will also be fixed
later. The received signals are:
Y =H1G
⊥
1 v˜1 + H1P1v1 + H2P2v2 + H2G
⊥
2 v˜2 + Q(u1 + u2) + N1 (90)
Z =G1P1v1 + G2H
−1
2 Qu2 + G2P2v2 + G1H
−1
1 Qu1 + N2 (91)
We now choose Q to be any N × (d + l) matrix with full column rank, and choose Pi =
GTi (GiG
T
i )
−1(GjH−1j )Q, where i, j ∈ {1, 2} , i 6= j. It can be verified that this selection
aligns vi with uj, i 6= j, at the eavesdropper, and this guarantees that the information
leakage is o(logP ). Next, let P
(1)
i , Q
(1) be matrices containing the first d columns of
Pi and Q, respectively, while P
(2)
i and Q
(2) contain the last l columns of Pi and Q, re-
spectively. Let B be a matrix whose columns lie in the nullspace of the matrix FT =
[H1G
⊥
1 H2G
⊥
2 H1P
(1)
1 H1P
(1)
1 Q
(1)]T . Note that F is a (N − l) × N matrix and
thus there exists a N × l matrix B such that FB = 0. We consider the filtered output
[Y˜, Yˆ]T = EY, where
E =
(
Dl×N
IN−l 0(N−l)×l
)
(92)
and D = (BTQ(2))−1BT and let
Y˜ =DH1P
(2)
1 v
(2)
1 + DH2P
(2)
2 v
(2)
2 + (u
(2)
1 + u
(2)
2 ) + DN1 (93)
Note that (93) represents the output at the receiver of a multiple access wiretap channel
with l antennas at each terminal. If l = 1, we let v
(2)
i = vi(d+1) be drawn uniformly and
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independently from the PAM constellation C(a,Q), with Q = P
1−δ
2(3+δ) and a = γP
1
2
Q
. Also,
u
(2)
i = ui(d+1) is chosen uniformly from C(a,Q) and independently from vj, j = 1, 2. The
receiver can then decode v1(d+1), v2(d+1) and (u1(d+1) + u2(d+1)) with vanishing probability of
error. On the other hand, if l = 2, we choose v
(2)
i and u
(2)
i as in the 2×2×2×2 multiple access
wiretap channel, i.e., vi(d+k) = t
T
k vˆik, k = 1, 2, where vˆik is an M dimensional vector whose
entries are drawn from the PAM constellation C(a,Q) with Q = P
1−δ
2(MS+δ) and a = γP
1
2
Q
, and
ti is chosen appropriately analogous to the selection for the 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 multiple access
wiretap channel, noting the similarity of (93) with (71). The cooperative jamming signal
u
(2)
i is chosen similarly. Then, the receiver can decode v
(2)
i and also u
(2)
1 +u
(2)
2 with vanishing
probability of error.
Thus, for l = 1, 2, v
(2)
i and u
(2)
1 + u
(2)
2 can be eliminated from Yˆ. Noting that 2(N −
K) + 3d ≤ N − l, v˜i and v(1)i can also be decoded from Y˜. We compute
I(v1,v2, v˜1, v˜2; Y) =I(v
(1)
1 ,v
(1)
2 , v˜1, v˜2; Y|v(2)1 ,v(2)2 ) + I(v(2)1 ,v(2)2 ; Y) (94)
The second term depends on the value of l. When l = 1,
I(v
(2)
1 ,v
(2)
2 ; Y) = log(2Q+ 1)
2 + o(logP ) (95)
=2
1− δ
(3 + δ)
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (96)
On the other hand, when l = 2, we have
I(v
(2)
1 ,v
(2)
2 ; Y) =
4M(1− δ)
MS + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (97)
Thus, in either case, by choosing δ sufficiently small and m large enough when l = 2, we
have
I(v
(2)
1 ,v
(2)
2 ; Y) =
2l
3
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (98)
Noting that v
(1)
1 ,v
(1)
2 , v˜1, v˜2 can be decoded to within noise variance from Y, given v
(2)
1 ,v
(2)
2 ,
the first term of (94) is
I(v
(1)
1 ,v
(1)
2 , v˜1, v˜2; Y|v(2)1 ,v(2)2 ) ≥2(d+N −K)
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (99)
Using (98) and (99) in (94), we have,
I(v1,v2, v˜1, v˜2; Y) ≥2
(
d+N −K + l
3
)(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (100)
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=
2
3
(2N −K)
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (101)
This completes the achievable schemes for the regime N
2
≤ K ≤ N .
6.3 Achievable Schemes for N ≤ K ≤ 4N3
As in the previous regime, we use structured PAM signaling along with Gaussian signaling.
Let d = bN
3
c and l = Nmod 3. Let vi =
(
v
(1)
i ,v
(2)
i
)
be the information symbols such
that the entries of v
(1)
i = {vij, j = 1, . . . , d} are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion ∼ N (0, αP ), and
the entries of v
(2)
i = {vij, j = d+ 1, . . . , d+ l} are structured PAM signals to be designed
later. Let ui =
(
u
(1)
i ,u
(2)
i
)
denote the cooperative jamming symbols such that the entries
of u
(1)
i = {uij, j = 1, . . . , d} are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion ∼ N (0, αP ), and the entries of
u
(2)
i = {uij, j = d+ 1, . . . , d+ l} are structured PAM signals independent of vj, j = 1, 2 and
uj, j 6= i. Transmitter i sends
Xi = Pivi + H
−1
i Qui (102)
where the P1, Q, and P2 are N × (d + l) precoding matrices to be designed. The channel
outputs are given by
Y =H1P1v1 + H2P2v2 + Q(u1 + u2) + N1 (103)
Z =G1P1v1 + G2H
−1
2 Qu2 + G2P2v2 + G1H
−1
1 Qu1 + N2 (104)
To ensure secrecy, we impose that for i 6= j
GiPi =GjH
−1
j Q (105)
We rewrite the conditions in (105) as
Ψ
[
PT1 P
T
2 Q
T
]T
= 02K×(d+l) (106)
where
Ψ
∆
=
[
G1 0K×N −G2H−12
0K×N G2 −G1H−11
]
(107)
Note that Ψ has a nullity 3N − 2K. This alignment is feasible if 3N − 2K ≥ d + l, i.e., if
K ≤ 4d+ l. This is satisfied since, in this regime, K ≤ 4d+ l+ 1
3
l, which implies K ≤ 4d+ 1
for integers N and K, since 0 ≤ l ≤ 2. This guarantees security and the information leakage
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is o(logP ). Next, let P =
(
P
(1)
i ,P
(2)
i
)
such that P
(1)
i , contains the first d columns of Pi.
We define Q(1) and Q(2) similarly. Let B be a matrix whose columns lie in the nullspace of
the matrix FT = [H1P
(1)
1 H1P
(1)
1 Q
(1)]T . Note that F is a (N − l)×N matrix and thus
there exists a non-zero N × l matrix B such that FB = 0. We consider the filtered output
[Y˜, Yˆ]T = EY, where E is as in (92). We have
Y˜ =DH1P
(2)
1 v
(2)
1 + DH2P
(2)
2 v
(2)
2 + (u
(2)
1 + u
(2)
2 ) + DN1 (108)
When l = 1, we choose v
(2)
i = vi(d+1) and u
(2)
i = ui(d+1) to be PAM signals drawn indepen-
dently from C(a,Q) with Q = P
1−δ
2(3+δ) and a = γP
1
2
Q
. The receiver can then decode v1(d+1),
v2(d+1) and (u1(d+1) + u2(d+1)) with vanishing probability of error. When l = 2, we choose
v
(2)
i and u
(2)
i analogous to the case of the 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 multiple access wiretap channel,
i.e., vi(d+k) = t
T
k vˆik, k = 1, 2, where vˆik is an M dimensional vector whose entries are drawn
from the PAM constellation C(a,Q) with Q = P
1−δ
2(MS+δ) and a = γP
1
2
Q
, and ti is chosen
appropriately, noting the similarity of (108) with (71). The cooperative jamming signals
u
(2)
i , i = 1, 2 are chosen similarly. Such a selection allows the receiver to decode v
(2)
i and
also u
(2)
1 + u
(2)
2 with vanishing probability of error. Thus, they can be eliminated from the
received observation Y.
Thus, we can eliminate v
(2)
i and u
(2)
1 + u
(2)
2 from Yˆ. Noting that 3d ≤ N − l, v(1)i =
{vij, j = 1, . . . , d} can also be decoded to within noise variance from Y. As in (96)-(97),
I(v
(2)
1 ,v
(2)
2 ; Y) =
2l
3
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (109)
Also, as in (99), we have
I(v
(1)
1 ,v
(1)
2 ; Y|v(2)1 ,v(2)2 ) ≥2d
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (110)
Using (109) and (110), we have
I(v1,v2; Y) ≥2
(
d+
l
3
)(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (111)
=
2
3
N
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (112)
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we determined the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the two-user MIMO multiple access
wiretap channel with N antennas at each transmitter, N antennas at the legitimate receiver
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and K antennas at the eavesdropper. For the case of fading channel gains, we provided
vector space alignment based achievable schemes that exploit the channel variation over
multiple time slots in general. When the channel gains are fixed, such channel diversity is
not available, and we provided single time-slot schemes that use real interference alignment
on structured signaling. We also provided matching converses to establish the optimality of
the achievable schemes for both fixed and fading channel gains. Our results highlight the
effect of the number of eavesdropper antennas on the s.d.o.f. of the multiple access wiretap
channel.
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